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NOTE

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2629th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 15 November 1985, at 3. p.m.

President: Mr. Richard A. Woolcott (Australia).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Burkina Faso, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Madagascar, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2629)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:

   (*a*) Letter dated 11 November 1985 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17618);

   (*b*) Letter dated 11 November 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17619)

The meeting was called to order at 5.30 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

(*a*) Letter dated 11 November 1985 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17618);

(*b*) Letter dated 11 November 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17619)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with a decision taken at the 2624th meeting, I invite the representative of Mauritius to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Seereekissoon (Mauritius) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with a desion taken at the 2624th meeting, I invite the Acting President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of that Council to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sinclair (Acting President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took a place at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with a decision taken at the 2624th meeting, I invite Mr. Toivo ya Toivo, Secretary-General of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Toivo ya Toivo took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [*2624th to 2626th and 2628th meetings*], I invite the representatives of Cameroon, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Libya Arab Jamahiriya, Senegal, South Africa, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Engo (Cameroon), Mr. Lewis (Canada), Mr. Oramas Oliva (Cuba), Mr. César (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. Lautenschlager (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Gbeho (Ghana), Mr. Rajaie-Khorassani (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Azzarouk (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Sarré (Senegal), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Bouziri (Tunisia) and Mr. Lusaka (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Council have before them document S/17633, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Burkina Faso, Egypt, India, Madagascar, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago.

6. The first speaker is the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

7. Mr. RAJAIE-KHORASSANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): At the outset, Sir, I must extend my sincere congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency. I have no doubt that under your leadership the Council will achieve considerable success, particularly as compared with its past record regarding the situation in Namibia. I congratulate you in advance on that success.

8. I must also extend my sincere condolences to the Government and people of Colombia on the natural disaster which has caused them so much suffering. I hope that God will grant the survivors great patience and that the international community will be able to help them and alleviate their suffering.

9. There is a verse from the Holy Koran which is very suitable in the context of today's debate. It reads:

> "And soon will the unjust assailants know what vicissitudes their affairs will take."[1]

10. The decade of the 1960s, which began with the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [*resolution 1514 (XV)*], culminated in the achievement of independence by colonial Territories and by Territories under the trusteeship of other States. Since then, 57 countries have become independent, the majority of them in the African continent. Although Namibia was one of the first of those Territories to be discussed in the United Nations in connection with the granting of independence and an end to colonialism, unfortunately, for many reasons, the people of Namibia have been prevented from gaining such a victory.

11. Since 1966, and particularly with the formation of the United Nations Council for Namibia, the international consciousness optimistically decided that an important step towards freeing the people of Namibia from the heavy yoke of imperialism had been taken, a step that would be followed by easier, faster steps towards fulfilling a long-held international aspiration. The anxious oppressed all over the world, who had been observing the situation in Namibia for years, hoped that the ice had finally been broken and that the journey towards the freedom of Namibia had at last started.

12. From then on, all anxious eyes were turned with hope towards the United Nations Council for Namibia. Unfortunately, however, 19 years have passed since then, and they are still anxiously waiting, but to no avail. To their disappointment, the Security Council, the very Council whose name has created false hopes and so many false expectations, has proved to be the malady, rather than the remedy.

13. In the Council there are some who have remained too politely and too politically silent in the face of the Namibian problem. We are absolutely convinced that such courteous delicacy is so important to certain members only because it pays off. When circumstances require, the same courteous, polite gentlemen behave as savagely and brutally as those in South Africa.

14. To be brief, I wish to ask all members of the Council a few simple questions. Why is it that imperialism is treated like a property that can be inherited or passed from one generation or country to another? Is it not the case that imperialism and colonialism and all their Eastern and Western, old and modern, manifestations must really die? On what grounds is the South African clique still holding the people of Namibia in its sanguinary claws?

15. Are not those that claim that "the achievement of peaceful independence for Namibia is of greater importance to the people of this country than it is to any organ of the United Nations" and that hurl blatant invective against States Members of the United Nations which emphatically demand the independence of Namibia the puppets and the servants of imperialism?

16. Why is it that, it spite of the will of the whole world, the so-called interim government collaborates with the plunderers? Why does it support the destroyers of all the national liberation movements? Why does it work hand in hand with the *apartheid* régime of Pretoria? Did not the Council itself declare that the establishment of the interim government was null and void? How, then, can we welcome the South African dilatory manoeuvres reflected in document S/17627?

17. The interim government is, as a matter of fact, another device for prolonging colonial domination over Namibia. So is the multi-party system, which aims at the assimilation and destruction of SWAPO in a group of surrogate parties that the enemy has invented for that purpose.

18. Two days ago [*2624th meeting*], the representative of the Pretoria régime once again in this chamber linked the independence of Namibia to the question of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Why is the independence of Namibia always obstructed by a linkage policy—by, let us say, a linkage excuse? It is most unfortunate that the supporters of that régime still defend such excuses.

19. The statement issued by the United States Department of State on 19 April 1985 contains the following piece of evidence:

> "We note that the South African announcement from Cape Town yesterday affirms South Africa's intention to pursue the current negotiating effort aimed at achieving independence for Namibia under the United Nations settlement plan. It is the United States position that these negotiations involving Namibian independence and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola offer the best prospect for a settlement leading to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978)." [*See S/17119, annex.*]

Again we see traces of the well-known linkage policy.

20. Why is it that implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples must be delayed and delayed in spite of all the support for that Declaration and the subsequent relevant resolutions?

21. Why is it that after a lapse of 100 years since the colonialization of Namibia, 40 years since the foundation of the United Nations, 25 years since the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and 19 years since the General

Assembly terminated the mandate of South Africa over Namibia we still must use step-by-step tactics? Is it not a fact that some Members are too patient and have good reasons for being patient? Is it still not time for comprehensive mandatory sanctions, as desired by the whole international community? Should we wait so long as to allow selective sanctions to be gradually replaced by consideration of comprehensive sanctions and then wait just as long for the word "consideration" to be deleted and for the actual execution of those sanctions to become possible?

22. I wish to request comprehensive mandatory sanctions instead of selective sanctions. The fact is that selective sanctions would entail many more years of suffering for the people of Namibia until the gradual strengthening of the Security Council decisions satisfies the requirements of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

23. There are hundreds of questions and many more quotations that could be brought before the Council, but I shall omit them simply for the sake of brevity.

24. My Government proposes that the committee called for in paragraph 12 of draft resolution S/17633 should take charge of also preparing a report on the actual impact and consequences of selective sanctions on the South African economic situation. Such a report may convince us that selective sanctions fall short of inducing the racist rulers of the Pretoria régime to comply with the will of the international community.

25. To appreciate why certain "respected" members of the Council are bound to condone all crimes of the Pretoria régime against its own people as well as those against the people of Namibia, the following quotation from *The New York Times* of 3 August 1985 will suffice:

> "while American bank lending to the South African public sector has been halved since 1982, to a total of $302.2 million as of March, loans to the private sector have soared. In particular, loans to South African banks skyrocketed to more than $3.5 billion as of September, from less than $500 million in 1979."

This means that those loans have increased sevenfold, and I believe this explains why certain support for the crimes committed by the criminals in South Africa seems to be justified by certain members.

26. Mr. ALLEYNE (Trinidad and Tobago): Mr. President, your country and mine have always maintained the most cordial and friendly relations and have co-operated in a broad range of activities. It gives me great pleasure, therefore, to see you, a distinguished diplomat of Australia, presiding over the affairs of the Council for the month of November.

27. Permit me also to extend our thanks and congratulations to Mr. Walters, of the United States, who directed the deliberations of the Council in October.

28. A great disaster has fallen suddenly on our sister nation of Colombia. I take this opportunity to convey to the Government and people of Colombia our great sorrow at this tragedy. To the families and relatives of those who perished we send our sincere condolences.

29. The Council is once again seized of a matter the importance of which is clear to us all. Settlement of this question is important for the interests of the people of Namibia who, because of the intransigence of the racist régime in Pretoria, are unable to express their right to self-determination and to develop as a free people. It is also very important to the smooth development of the States of the southern African region—the constant victims of unprovoked acts of aggression by the South African régime—and, indeed, important to the international community at large.

30. Can the Council, which was charged by the whole community of nations with maintaining international peace and security, continue to stand irresolute while the inhuman and abhorrent system of *apartheid* still persists? Can it remain unmoved when a trust which was reposed in good faith, but obviously in error, to a Member of the United Nations in respect of Namibia has been betrayed and when the trustee, despite its sacred obligations, holds fast to what is not its own and keeps in servitude the peoples entrusted to it.

31. What is at stake, therefore, is also the good name and the credibility of the United Nations and of the Security Council which are so crucial to the effective functioning of these bodies.

32. This is indeed a very serious question. The submission by South Africa to the Council in a letter dated 12 November 1985 [*S/17627*] and the most recent intervention by its representative in the Council [*2624th meeting*] are proof positive that whatever games the régime is playing, it is not cricket. Had it been, I remind my colleagues, South Africa would have long departed the trusted wicket and Namibia would now be batting with free and flourishing strokes to the glory of its own people.

33. Instead, we have South Africa attempting by a ploy to impose upon the Council and the world a puppet régime, a so-called Transitional Government of National Unity at Windhoek, which the international community in all its forums had already rejected out of hand for the fake that it obviously was. It reminds one of the stratagem employed in certain circles where, in consideration of a noble cause, there is tacked on to the main document an unacceptable provision in the hope that it would ride piggyback, as it were, to acceptance and approval. Or it may be a double ploy to ensure rejection of the whole document, including the substantive question, in this case selection of the electoral system which would have triggered the other steps preceding elections, such as the repealing of all discriminatory or restrictive laws and regulations, the return of refugees, the withdrawal of South African forces, and the release of political prisoners.

34. The Council, by its resolution 566 (1985), specifically condemned the installation by the racist régime in South Africa of a so-called Transitional Government of National

Unity at Windhoek, which constituted a direct affront to the Council, and declared it to be illegal and null and void and further declared that no recognition would be accorded by the United Nations or any Member State to the illegally installed régime or to any representative or organ established in pursuance thereof.

35. That South Africa, in the light of this, should issue as part of an official document of the Security Council [*see S/17627, annex*] a statement by the so-called cabinet of that Transitional Government purporting to state its choice on the question of an electoral system for Namibia is an affront to the Council and a clear, unambiguous manifestation of the utter contempt in which the Pretoria régime holds the Council and the international community.

36. Since the United Nations does not recognize the so-called interim government in Namibia, for South Africa to attempt to give some degree of legality and credibility to the collection of surrogates and puppets that comprise the interim administration clearly indicates that South Africa has embarked on a new phase of its obstructionist policy with regard to Namibian independence and self-determination.

37. The Council must clearly demonstrate to South Africa that it has made a serious miscalculation of the determination and commitment of the Council to ensure the implementation of its resolutions and its resolve to carry out its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations. It is clear that the introduction by South Africa of extraneous issues such as "linkage" or "parallelism", which seek to impose irrelevant preconditions on the resolution of the problem, undoubtedly undermines South Africa's claim of desiring a peaceful solution to the crisis.

38. The responses of the Council to the political and diplomatic machinations of the racist régime must be firm. In the context of Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the Charter, the Council should affirm that South Africa's intransigence on the Namibian question, by its aggressive acts against the people of Namibia and its non-compliance with the Council resolutions on Namibia, constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and the Council must accordingly decide what measures are to be employed to give effect to its own resolutions. In its deliberations on this question, the Council must always be mindful of the fact that the illegally occupied territory of Namibia is used as a springboard by South Africa for acts of aggression against other countries in southern Africa in contravention of the Charter.

39. The draft resolution before us provides a framework for action by the Council at this time. By the draft resolution, the Council would decide to impose mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter, and in conformity with its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security it must act. It should, moreover, decide to adopt enforcement measures against South Africa, including those outlined in paragraph 8 of the draft resolution.

40. The imposition of mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter would be one of the most effective ways to obtain South Africa's compliance with the relevant Council resolution. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago urges the members of the Council to act unanimously, support the draft resolution and help realize the goals of the Council with respect to Namibia.

41. The PRESIDENT: It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before us. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote.

42. I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

43. Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom): The subject of this debate is a problem on which, as I said yesterday [*2626th meeting*], the members of the Council have one view: we are all agreed on the illegality of South African occupation of Namibia and on the necessity of Namibia gaining its freedom and independence in accordance with Security Council resolution 435 (1978) without delay. We agree unanimously on the goal, but sadly it appears that we are not agreed on the details of action.

44. This is sad because unanimity is perhaps our best means to achieve our common goal. Numerous speakers in this debate have emphasized the importance of reflecting, in the vote on the draft resolution, the unanimity which unquestionably exists within the Council with regard to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.

45. I was struck, for example, by the remarks yesterday by the representative of Burkina Faso [*ibid.*] about the value of consensus. At that same meeting, you, yourself, Sir, joined me in drawing attention to the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa, adopted by the heads of Governments of Commonwealth States at their meeting at Nassau from 16 to 22 October last,[2] and you hoped to see a firm resolution which would attract unanimous support and which would send a clear and strong signal to South Africa.

46. The representative of Canada spoke in similar terms this morning [*2628th meeting*]. Both the representative of Denmark and I strongly hoped for unanimity, and when I said those things I believed they were achievable. In seeking to work with other members of the Council for a unanimous resolution, the United Kingdom was not engaging in empty rhetoric or looking for a comfortable berth. It was our belief, which I think is widely shared in the Council and throughout the United Nations, that our best chance of influencing South Africa lay through a resolution which was at the same time firm, realistic and supported by all 15 members of the Council. We felt that a less than unanimous Council, on the other hand, would only encourage South Africa and anyone else opposed to an early negotiated settlement of the Namibian problem. It would encourage them to play upon our differences. It would mask our common determination to procure forthwith the independence of Namibia.

47. As I said in my statement yesterday, the United Kingdom has joined with other countries representing more than one third of the membership of the United Nations in a strategy designed to exercise firm and controlled pressure upon South Africa through a number of agreed voluntary measures. We proposed, both publicly and in private discussion with the sponsors of the draft resolution, that the Council should adopt a resolution endorsing these measures and consistent with this strategy. We made abundantly clear to the sponsors our readiness to vote for a resolution which included a considerable list of non-mandatory economic measures. It is to our great regret that this serious, realistic and constructive proposal has not been accepted.

48. It would have shown the South African Government that it had no allies and could hope for none. It would have shown them that if they persisted in their illegal occupation of Namibia, the consequences would have been mounting pressures. It would have shown them that their presence in Namibia was—and is—counter-productive for their own interests.

49. I cannot but feel, as a practical matter, that the rejection of our clear and principled advice will be unfortunate for the people of Namibia, and also for Angola. We regret this missed opportunity. It is worse than an error; it is a blunder. Defeat has been snatched from the jaws of unanimity and a victory of sorts has been handed to South Africa.

50. Having offered a better course, my delegation will be obliged to vote against the draft resolution, because it is likely to be counter-productive and because it would have the effect of pre-empting the strategy on which we have agreed with our Commonwealth partners. We on our side are not prepared to render nugatory the very significant agreement reached at Nassau barely a month ago. It is a great pity that our efforts to achieve unanimity have been frustrated and that comfort has thereby been afforded to the party which least deserves it: South Africa.

51. Nevertheless, my Government remains determined to work for the independence of Namibia without delay.

52. Mr. de KÉMOULARIA (France) (*interpretation from French*): Sir, it is with pleasure that I follow the tradition of hailing your accession to the presidency of the Council and express wishes for success during your term as President. Each of my predecessors has spoken of and referred to their countries' relations with Australia. As you know, it is a country I know well, and so I am the best person to testify to the excellent relations between Australia and France. I cannot myself talk about cricket, as some of my colleagues have done, but I could mention rugby, since we have often met on the rugby field, the field of friendship.

53. On behalf of my delegation, I should like to ask the representative of the United States, Mr. Okun, to accept our thanks for the good humour, competence and authority demonstrated by the presidency of our friend Mr. Walters.

54. France has a clear and consistent position on Namibia. France voted in favour of Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), which, in our view, should be applied without any conditions or prerequisites whatsoever, as I said last June [*2589th meeting*]. In particular, the linkage established by South Africa between implementation of the United Nations plan and withdrawal of the Cuban troops is not relevant.

55. The Pretoria Government's obstinacy and its continuing intransigence are fraught with consequences for the stability of the region. Measures must therefore be taken to bring the South African Government to abide by the resolutions of the Council and put an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia. This is the concern which led the French authorities to participate in the drafting and the adoption of resolution 566 (1985). This same concern led us to adopt an equally constructive approach during negotiations on the draft resolution which is now before us, negotiations which we would have liked to be able to continue.

56. In this debate, as in all debates of the Council, France is concerned with realism and effectiveness. Unfortunately, while we agree with the feelings that lie behind this draft resolution, it does not meet those concerns. The wording does not seem to us the most appropriate for enabling progress to be made towards the solution the international community has outlined for the question of Namibia. That is why my delegation will, regretfully, abstain in the vote. However, I should like to say that France, on its own initiative and within the framework of the European Economic Community, will continue to pursue its actions and to exert increased pressure upon South Africa. France has demonstrated its resolve through the measures it has already taken, measures which have been recently added to by the Prime Minister of France.

57. Mr. OKUN (United States of America): Permit me at the outset, Sir, on behalf of the entire American delegation, to welcome your assumption of the presidency of the Council. We feel confident that our vessel will be well steered under such a distinguished helmsman, distinguished alike for his wisdom, energy and tact.

58. Permit me also to express the deep regret of my Government at the news of the recent natural calamity in Colombia. In expressing sympathy with our sister Republic to the south, we do so in the knowledge that the brave people of Colombia will surmount this tragedy, as they have other difficult times in the past.

59. At this critical juncture in the history of southern Africa, a debate such as the one under way here in the Council holds particular relevance. We have come a long way since the Council adopted resolution 435 (1978) seven years ago. One hurdle after another has been overcome, and we find ourselves today—I should like to hope—near the end of an arduous journey. An act or two more of goodwill, gestures of true statesmanship by the involved parties, and the region will have taken a major step towards a peaceful solution of the problems and strife that now beset it.

60. My Government welcomes the announcement by the South African authorities that proportional representation has been selected as a framework for elections in Namibia. The United States expects that South Africa will strictly adhere to the election modalities as outlined in the settlement plan and endorsed by the Council in resolution 435 (1978). I quote the following from that plan. Section I states that:

> "the Secretary-General [will] appoint a United Nations special representative whose central task will be to make sure that conditions are established which will allow free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process. The Special Representative will be assisted by a United Nations transition assistance group." [*See S/12636, para. 2.*]

Section II states that:

> "The elections will be under the supervision and control of the United Nations" [*ibid., para. 5*].

I recall also that the plan has been adopted and accepted by the South African Government.

61. As my British colleague did yesterday [*2626th meeting*], I too must refer to the request addressed to you, Mr. President, by six Namibian political parties to participate in this debate. The United States believes it most important that all relevant parties with information to impart to the Council be permitted to speak under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. Such a stance is consistent with the universality of the United Nations. Furthermore, all parties should be accorded equal treatment under the terms of the settlement plan. Hence, it is our view that a request from one or another member of a Namibian political party to address the Council should be accorded sympathetic consideration.

62. That said, it is the long-standing view of my Government, as well as other members of the Council, that persons acting as representatives of the so-called transitional government, the creation of which was declared null and void by the Council, should not be given the right to speak here.

63. As regards the draft resolution before us, it is with regret that we shall vote against it. My delegation will do so because it would impose mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. My Government's position on this matter is well known. I would add in this case that, actively engaged as the United States is in seeking a negotiated solution of the problem of Namibia, we would utterly negate our good offices by supporting mandatory sanctions. We sincerely regret that this draft resolution persisted in that short-sighted course of action.

64. The PRESIDENT: I shall now put the draft resolution in document S/17633 to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Australia, Burkina Faso, China, Denmark, Egypt, India, Madagascar, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: France.

The result of the vote was 12 in favour, 2 against and 1 abstention. The draft resolution was not adopted, the negative votes being those of permanent members of the Council.

65. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

66. Mr. ALZAMORA (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): In my capacity as co-ordinator of the non-aligned States members of the Council, I should like to make some comments on the draft on which we have just voted.

67. As the members of the Council are aware, the Political Declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Luanda from 4 to 7 September last [*S/17610 and Corr.1, annex I*], urged the Security Council to meet once again to consider the question of Namibia and to renew the appeal for the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

68. In furtherance of that mandate received from the non-aligned countries, the delegation of India, in its capacity as Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, requested this series of meetings of the Council, which over the past three days has been dealing with the question of the decolonization of Namibia.

69. As the result of that debate, the non-aligned countries jointly submitted the draft resolution which was just voted on and which reflects their true feeling as to the strategy to be followed in the case of Namibia. Since its presentation within the due time-limit, the sponsors maintained constant contacts with delegations, seeking to bring their positions closer to our own. In some cases we achieved that completely, as is reflected in the draft resolution and the result of the vote. There were substantive considerations which we were unable to reconcile as the inevitable result of different approaches to the problem, and as is only normal those differences were also reflected in the vote.

70. To negotiate is to seek convergence and consensus when that is possible. However, that is often not possible in the United Nations and elsewhere in spite of the efforts made and the goodwill shown, as has occurred here. But to negotiate is not to falter or to submit, although those efforts proved insufficient in the face of circumstances which ruled out consensus.

71. In connection with progress made in other organizations and associations—which we duly appreciate—we

must recall that we are acting here within the Security Council and, accordingly, consistent with its own precedents, aims and policies which are autonomous, reflecting a universal process and the composition of the General Assembly and thus the reality of the world around us.

72. We non-aligned countries trust that the growing awareness of all the peoples of the world of the undeniable justice of Namibia's case and the inexorable force of history will allow us soon to overcome those disagreements and together bring about the end of the illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia and ensure the final achievement of its freedom and independence.

73. The PRESIDENT: I wish now to speak briefly in my capacity as representative of Australia.

74. Australia voted for the draft resolution. We did so to express our strong support for the cause of Namibian independence and our attachment to the United Nations plan under resolution 435 (1978). As I said in my statement yesterday [*2626th meeting*], Australia supports the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions in order to bring South Africa to accept its international obligations and bring Namibia to early independence. Australia is also fully committed to the approach adopted by the heads of Governments of Commonwealth States at their recent meeting at Nassau, as set out in the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa.[2]

75. Just as the Commonwealth Accord was adopted by consensus, so we would have wished the Council to proceed today on the basis of consensus or unanimity, which would have sent a clear and unambiguous signal to South Africa. The Australian delegation worked actively, with others, to achieve a resolution which would have met that objective. We regret that it was not possible to achieve it on this occasion and hope that the Council will be able to attain a unanimous position when it next meets to consider the situation in Namibia.

76. I now resume my function as President of the Council.

77. The Council has concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.

NOTES

[1] See XXVI: 227.
[2] See A/40/817.

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

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